

eduroam

Geert Jan de Groot
based on slides by Paul Dekkers - SURFnet


Universities do..

Universities and research institutions do

- * Teach
- * Research
- * **Co-operate**

Co-operation

- To work together, you must communicate
 - Visit each other
 - People exchanges?
- Accessing a network is hard
 - Local network or remote
 - One wifi password just does not scale
 - You want individual passwords
 - accountability, people leaving, ...
- Login portals suck
 - Typing in passwords is cumbersome
 - Over and over
 - And how about mobile phone w/ wifi? Small keyboards? yuk!



• Wi-fi access methods

- Open access (no password)
- Open access with portal
- WEP
- WPA/WPA2 with PSK (Private Shared Key)
- WPA/WPA2 with 802.1X (“WPA enterprise”)

WPA enterprise

- WPA enterprise uses 802.1x technologies
 - “authenticate using username and password” - individual!
 - Authenticate using RADIUS (which SSE did yesterday!)
 - Login is automatic, like with others
 - Open laptop, network!
 - But, it’s authenticated


```
steve    Cleartext-Password := "AfricaWorldCup!"  
bob      Cleartext-Password := "s3cr3t"  
john     Cleartext-Password := "ilovejane"  
jane     Cleartext-Password := "ilovejohn"
```

Guests from other networks

- Guest accounts are a pain
 - Administration, synchronisation
- RADIUS allows confederations
 - joe@blue-university.sd
 - jane@green-university.ng
- RADIUS confederations allow referrals to other RADIUS servers
 - joe@blue-university.sd -> RADIUS at blue-university.sd
 - jane@green-university.ng -> RADIUS at green-university.ng
- No local administration of guest accounts!

Putting it together

- The Wifi network 'eduroam' uses WPA enterprise, RADIUS confederations
- When joe@blue-university.sd visits your institution he connects to the 'eduroam' network.
- User gets authenticated using his home RADIUS-server
 - Authenticated access
 - Fully automatic - open up laptop, connected
- You accept my guests, I accept your guests
- Doing eduroam at AfNOG for awareness, testing, play and fun!



A map of Europe with numerous colored circles (yellow, orange, red) scattered across the continent, representing the locations of eduroam wireless networks. The circles are more densely packed in Western and Central Europe. Labels for various countries and seas are visible on the map.

About eduroam

Standardization

- Wireless
 - encryption
 - network name
- Authentication
 - usernames with @institution.nl
 - secure mechanism, federated

- Agreements



HOTSPOTS OVER EDUROAM

ENGLISH | NEDERLANDS



- eduroam hotspots in:**
- 's-Hertogenbosch
 - Amsterdam
 - Breda
 - Delft
 - Eindhoven
 - Enschede
 - Groningen
 - Leiden
 - Maastricht
 - Rotterdam
 - Tilburg
 - Utrecht
 - Zwolle

Why did we start eduroam

- **Security problems,**
traditional wireless LAN is not safe:
 - who is (ab)using the (wireless) network?
 - are people eavesdropping?
 - weak (or no) encryption, authentication
- **Difficult to allow guests**
 - User-identification
 - Distribute secrets?
- **Users are mobile**
(Bologna process, ECTS, ...)

Why did we start eduroam

- **Ease of use!**

Always connected (like 2/3/4G? *)


Even on busy places, in cities, ...

Open up your laptop and bang! You're online

**) mobile data doesn't always work well on crowded locations or in buildings, Wi-Fi / eduroam can be used for seamlessly offloading data*


4G won't replace Wi-Fi, they both have their own roadmap

Wireless



Wireless and basic security


- Every network has a name: an (in)visible SSID (Service Set Identifier)
- Possible to restrict on MAC addresses
- Access / encryption with “keys”
 - WEP, Wired Equivalent Privacy
 - WPA(2), with pre-shared key (PSK)
- Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS)
 - easier setup, with a PIN
 - no need for SSID or key



Sorry: all of this is insecure...

- Invisible SSID?
 - You need the SSID to associate to a (hidden) network, so just wait for someone to associate
 - Without encryption, easy to eaves-drop, spoof / steal a session, inject packages (MitM)
 - MAC security? Easy to spoof!
- WEP uses weak RC4 encryption
- WPA keys can be “recovered” with (re)association
- WPS is required for Wi-Fi certification, but:
 - The PIN can be brute forced

“Computervredebreuk” is too easy Tools are easy to find! Aircrack-ng, Reaver



```
root@bt: ~  
File Edit View Terminal Help  
  
Aircrack-ng 1.1 r2178  
  
[00:00:13] 5589 keys tested (424.47 k/s)  
  
KEY FOUND! [ 2013w1f1pwD ]  
  
Master Key      : 36 38 EA F0 17 AD E5 BD AD 5A 94 6F 62 27 68 AA  
                 47 0D FA 96 38 77 7A B0 61 E5 9D 24 2C 4B 55 55  
  
Transient Key   : 5B 5D 2E 02 1B E9 B6 EC 0F BD AC 8F FF D8 5C 1F  
                 F5 54 A1 52 4A F5 A8 CE CD 45 54 F6 BE 46 CA A6  
                 01 C0 EC C3 72 72 FA E0 62 E9 99 FC 1F 16 A8 26  
                 8A 1B 72 A1 0F 06 31 3E A0 1C E8 57 9D E4 07 93  
  
EAPOL HMAC     : C1 61 0C 0A 80 75 F4 52 CF E5 9C BE 83 E7 B5 74  
root@bt:~#
```

Cracking Wpa & Wpa2 in 5 mins using BackTrack 5 R3


Open wireless network

- ... was always a bad idea:
 - who is (ab)using the network?
 - are people eavesdropping?
- Weak encryption, no authentication, no traceability
- Perfect Man-in-the-Middle
 - easy to make a rogue Access Point
 - required VPN or end-to-end encryption
 - OpenSSL vulnerabilities and unpatched devices (Android!) are more risky than ever before




OpenSSL vulnerabilities (Android oops)

- SSL is everywhere
- CVE-2014-0224 and SSLv3 vulnerability made this worse



Open wireless with captive portal

- **Captive portals are insecure**
 - Not possible to check **certificate revocation**
 - **OCSP** (online service) is unreachable (or can be made so, with soft-fail)
 - Still easy to create a **Man-in-the-Middle**
- Easy to create a **Rogue AP**
 - Tethering on your phone, can even call this “t-mobile” or “KPN”...




So we needed something better

- Ease of use:
Open up your laptop and bang! You're online!
- Identify users at the edge of the network
- Scalable: use existing user administration
- Open standards,
future proof
- Secure
- Allow guests
- Set a standard:




802.1x

- “Port” based authentication




802.1x and guest usage: eduroam!



802.1x and EAP



- Extensible Authentication Protocol
- Different EAP-types
- The (home-)organization decides type for their users
- EAP-types with SSL/TLS
 - “Mutual authentication”
 - Encryption keys are derived from SSL session
- EAP is transported and proxied in RADIUS

Secure international roaming





Client configuration eduroam

- 3 step configuration
- IdP pinning









Client configuration eduroam

- Windows just as easy: 3 steps



Client configuration eduroam

INSTÄLLPRÖFILE



eduroam CAT

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://cat.eduroam.org>. The page title is "Welcome to eduroam CAT" and the subtitle is "eduroam Configuration Assistant Tool". The eduroam logo is in the top right corner. Below the title, there are links for different languages: [Català](#), [Deutsch](#), [English\(GB\)](#), [Español](#), [Euskara](#), [Français](#), [Galego](#), [Hrvatski](#), [Italiano](#), [Norsk](#), [Polski](#), [Português](#), [Slovenčina](#), [Slovenščina](#), [Srpski](#), [Suomi](#), and a [Start page](#) link.

On the left side, there is a navigation menu with links: [About eduroam](#), [About eduroam CAT](#), [Terms of use](#), [FAQ](#), [Report a problem](#), [Become a CAT developer](#), [eduroam admin: manage your IdP](#).

The main content area features a large blue box with the text: "eduroam installation made easy: MS Windows 8, 7, Vista, XP". Below this, it says "Custom built for your home institution" and "Digitally signed by the organisation that coordinates eduroam: TERENA".

To the right of this text is a screenshot of the "eduroam installer for University of Samplecity" window. The window title is "eduroam installer for University of Samplecity". It contains the eduroam logo, the text "Welcome to the eduroam installer", and the following information: "This installer has been prepared for University of Samplecity. The installer will create the following wireless profiles: eduroam (TKIP), eduroam. The non TKIP profile is preferred. Always use it if you have a choice. More information and comments: EMAIL: eduroam@samplecity.xx WWW: http://eduroam.samplecity.xx Installer created with software from the GEANT project." At the bottom of the window are "Next >" and "Cancel" buttons.

At the bottom of the page, there is a blue button that says "eduroam user: download your eduroam installer".

The footer contains the text: "eduroam CAT - Release CAT-1.0.4 © 2011-13 DANTE Ltd. on behalf of the GN3 and GN3plus consortia". To the right of this text are the DANTE logo and the European Union flag. Further right is the text: "European Commission Communications Networks, Content and Technology".




eduroam
**YOU HAVE
JUST BEEN
EDUROAMED**



eduroam
**YOU HAVE
JUST BEEN
EDUROAMED**

Wireless: the RF challenge



Wireless experience

- A bad Wi-Fi experience, translates to:
 - Frustrated and complaining users
 - “eduroam sucks”
... even when eduroam is not at fault
- Some planning... makes sense
 - Eg. consider high-density rooms for lectures (hotspots vs. overall coverage)
 - Think about the building, AP placement

eduroam Visitor Access (eVA)

The image shows a screenshot of the eduroam eVA web interface on a mobile device. The interface is titled "My visitors" and displays a list of "Current visitors".

eduroam Wladimir Mufly Sign Out Help & Support

My eVA Administrator
My eVA My visitors

My visitors

Current visitors

- Sjonnie Stekman**
Username: 001702@edu.nl
Email: Sjonnie@Stekman-research.com
Tel:
21-May-2014 to 22-May-2014
[Edit] [Disable]
- Groep: Unwired 2014 - Workshop (1703)**
Username: 001703@edu.nl
Email:
Tel:
21-May-2014 to 22-May-2014
[Edit] [Disable]
- Groep: Unwired 2014 - Workshop (1704)**

You can still invite a maximum of **95 campus visitors** and enable them the campus eduroam Wi-Fi network maximum period of **3 days**.

[+ Add visitor]
[+ Add Group of visitors]

Text Message Today 15:46


Example

username: geyi@edu.nl
password: cqoe
Wi-Fi: eduroam
validity: 1 day


Text Message Send

Q W E R T Y U I O P
A S D F G H J K L
↑ Z X C V B N M ↵
123 🌐 spatie return


eduroam growth



usage: peak every new semester



Statistics; usage between countries



eduroam in a nutshell (1)

- **Wireless**
 - SSID eduroam
 - WPA2-Enterprise
- **RADIUS**
 - authentication in @domain.nl
preferably public CA
 - forward the rest transparently (!)
- **Monitoring**

...

eduroam in a nutshell (2)

- Logging
- Quarantaine
- IPv6
- VLANs
- Guests, eVA
- eduroam CAT, installers

*eduroam has proven to be the standard for wireless in edu!
value for the end-users*

Demonstration

- The access point 'eduroam-demo' is connected to a single RADIUS-server
 - No confederation, sorry guys
- Set up some test accounts:

```
user1    Cleartext-Password := "pass1"  
user2    Cleartext-Password := "pass2"  
user3    Cleartext-Password := "pass3"  
user4    Cleartext-Password := "pass4"  
user5    Cleartext-Password := "pass5"  
user6    Cleartext-Password := "pass6"  
user7    Cleartext-Password := "pass7"
```

- Experiment!

AP configuration example

The screenshot displays the configuration page for a wireless interface in LuCI. The browser address bar shows the URL: `https://197.4.11.250/cgi-bin/luci/stok=9eca67d6734bcad7d8252d899b359abe/admin/network/wireless/radi...`. The page title is "eduroam-ap - Wifi - LuCI".

The configuration is divided into several sections:

- Channel:** 1 (2.412 GHz)
- Transmit Power:** 20 dBm (100 mW)

The **Interface Configuration** section is active, with the **Wireless Security** tab selected. The settings are as follows:

Field	Value
Encryption	WPA2-EAP
Cipher	auto
Radius-Authentication-Server	197.4.15.170
Radius-Authentication-Port	1812 <small>Default 1812</small>
Radius-Authentication-Secret	afnog!
Radius-Accounting-Server	197.4.15.170
Radius-Accounting-Port	1813 <small>Default 1813</small>
Radius-Accounting-Secret	afnog!
NAS ID	

The search bar at the bottom of the page shows the search term "luc" and indicates "More than 100 matches".

Questions?

EDUroam contact:

paul.dekkers [at] [surfnet.nl](mailto:paul.dekkers@surfnet.nl)

